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W
ho knew some states require a license to raise
frogs? Boxers, auctioneers, and hair braiders
along with doctors, lawyers, and dentists, of
course, all need licenses. So do wrestlers. California licenses
178 occupations, while Kansas regulates only 47. Most Fifth
District states fall somewhere in between: from South
Carolina, which licenses 55 occupations, to Maryland, which
licenses 89.
Morris M. Kleiner, a labor economist at the University of
Minnesota, has spent much of his career studying licensing. In
his new book Licensing Occupations: Ensuring Quality or
Restricting Competition?, he covers a lot of ground, from the 
earliest codified laws, the Babylonian Code of Hammurabi, to
present trends.
Today, licensing is one of the fastest-growing labor 
market institutions in the United States. It hasn’t exactly
resulted in what consumers might expect. Economists 
have found that occupational licensing increases prices 
in most regulated services by driving up wages from 
4 percent to 12 percent. Meanwhile, it’s unclear whether 
quality improves enough so that 
consumers are better off.
In an effort to provide a full account
of licensing’s costs and benefits,
Kleiner has gathered history and
research, adding new analysis, tables,
and figures that document and update
licensing issues. He discusses at length
the economic theory that underpins
licensing and includes state trends as
well as how employment rules abroad
affect the labor market and wages in
the European Union. The ultimate
question is whether the public is better
off when occupations are regulated or
whether consumers just end up paying
more without much benefit.
More Licensing 
but Less Research
Although the number of people in
licensed occupations has grown to
about 20 percent of the work force from some 
4.5 percent in the 1950s, studies of licensing lately have
been few and far between. How come?
On the recent dearth of research, Kleiner has this to
say: “Perhaps this lack of recent analysis is because the
topic lies at the intersection of labor economics, law,
and industrial organization and thus does not fit easily
within one of the subfields of the social sciences as they
have evolved.”
Kleiner explains the nuts and bolts of licensing.
Usually it’s the members of a profession themselves
who lobby for licensing, reasoning that it’s necessary to
stipulate certain training and benchmarks of quality,
especially as technology has grown, requiring 
higher-skilled labor. But there’s another, less-publicized
motivation: “The expectation from economic theory is
that licensing may create windfall gains or rents, and
that these prospective gains in income provide an
important impetus for licensure,” Kleiner writes. In
other words, licensing may be more beneficial to those
licensed than to consumers.
For high-income professions, like dentists and
lawyers, regulation results in a kind of monopoly 
power because entry is limited in a variety of ways.
(Licensing of this sort is not to be confused with the
academic training that lawyers and doctors, among 
others, undergo — though, in some cases, obtaining
such formal training may be a
licensing requirement.) Professional
associations justify resulting 
higher prices by explaining that
expert supervisors and standard-
ized practices bring about higher 
quality service on average.
(Standard practices can also stifle




Most of us assume licensing 
provides assurances of quality 
and safety in the case of medical 
professionals or home builders or
furnace fixers. But when is the 
last time you checked a state
regulatory Web site to make sure
your doctor still had a license?
Perhaps we depend too much on
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would like for their furnace repairman to know 
something about boilers before hiring him. So it stands
to reason that licensing would protect consumers,
right?
Not necessarily. The impact of licensing on 
quality is unclear. Kleiner and others who have studied
the issue say licensing shows “no effects on average 
consumer well-being relative to
little or no regulation.” What is
clear, though, is that increased
prices are associated with highly
regulated services. Even when
entry restrictions raise the 
quality of practitioners, fewer
people may use their services as
the price and wait time go up. So
some consumers are made worse
off. The wealthy, and in the case
of health care, those with 
generous insurance plans may be
exceptions because they can
afford to pay the higher prices.
As a result, licensing can raise significant distributional
concerns. 
Could lack of regulation contribute to catastrophe,
such as disease or building collapse? “Although there are
many anecdotes that document worker negligence or
incompetence that have led to major serious injury or
even deaths, there is little evidence that licensing would
have eliminated serious tragedies in any systematic
manner,” Kleiner writes.
Economists point out that licensing and 
restrictive rules limit supply and mobility across state
lines in some professions. And everyone knows what
limited supply can do: curtail consumer choices, 
especially if prices and wages have become unaffordable
for some people, which sometimes happens with the
poor and dental care, for example. For professions with
higher education and earnings (dentists, lawyers, 
doctors, and so forth), Kleiner says, licensing “appears
to have large effects through either limiting entry or
restricting movement into the state. However, for 
other occupations such as teachers, nurses, and 
cosmetologists, the impact of licensing on earnings 
is murky, with some studies finding small effects and
others finding none.” 
Licensing keeps out the competition, according 
to the “capture theory.” If demand for a service is 
relatively inelastic, then higher prices will lead to 
higher income for the licensed professionals. That
means the benefits are larger for dentists than for 
hairdressers, for example, because there are fewer 
substitutes for dentists than hairdressers. 
Alternatives
Occupational licensing is often justified on the grounds
that “information asymmetries” create market failures. In
short, the consumer of a service may not be able to 
accurately judge the claims of a provider. Consider a 
person going to a mechanic to get his car fixed. Does the
car really need all the repairs that the mechanic suggests?
Or is he taking advantage of the consumer’s relative lack
of knowledge? And, assuming that
all the repairs are necessary, is the
mechanic capable of actually doing
the job? These are tough questions
for the average consumer to
answer. Proponents of licensing
argue that a third party is often
necessary to set basic standards for
providers so that consumers can
be reasonably assured that they are
going to get an accurate diagnosis
and good service. 
But, as has been discussed,
licensing may be a costly way to
achieve this goal. Kleiner suggests
that it might be possible, instead, to use certification, a
weaker form of regulation. Certification documents that
providers have met specific standards yet does not carry
licensing’s restrictions on competition imposed through
barriers to entry and mobility. Physicians, for example,
can become “board certified” in specialties. Some 200
occupations have certification. Registration is another
possibility, one that is even less restrictive. People file
information and qualifications with an agency before
practicing, which could also include posting a bond. 
Kleiner compares licensing with certification in 
two states. Minnesota certifies physical therapists, 
respiratory care providers, and physicians’ assistants,
while Wisconsin licenses those professions. Evidence
showed that licensing compared to certification in those 
professions “provides no obvious benefits to consumers as
measured by complaints to regulatory boards.”
But to change the current system, occupational 
licensing needs more visibility. As Kleiner points out in
the book’s final paragraph, “policies passed by legislatures
on occupational licensing are back-burner issues.”
Kleiner’s book is a thorough examination of a topic 
that’s not as exciting as interest rates or the stock market.
But quieter economic trends need airing too. In simple
prose that only occasionally strays into economic jargon,
Kleiner makes a strong case against excessive licensing.
Such rules can keep people out of occupations, 
raising prices and distorting labor markets. How 
much longer will we allow professionals, rather than 
consumers, decide who can provide the most 
competent service?                                   RF
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Kleiner and others say
licensing shows “no
effects on average 
consumer well-being
relative to little 
or no regulation.” 